In explaining southern defeat, Joseph Glaathaar places greater weight on the slaves deserting the South to serve in the Union Army. Slavery allowed the South to enroll more white soldiers, knowing the home front would remain productive. But advancing northern armies acted like a magnet on slaves, pulling them away from plantations, thus depriving the South of its productive labor.
Upon enlisting in the Union Army, ex-slaves then added their decisive number in manpower to the northern war effort--some ,thus obtaining victory.
Many readers well-versed in the ACW can come up with their own mix of reasons why the outcome was so. I'm Gill, and I'm a Civil War buff. Jerel Wilmore. This book of essays is an excellent introduction to some of the historical theories why the South lost the American Civil War. I enjoyed James M. He says why best: the Union had better leadership. Hang on Dixie fans: sure, the South had St. The North provided the leadership—Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—which won the war.
The Union also provided superior leadership and management of logistics. And, at the very top, there was one Abraham Lincoln. To tell the truth, I found it a little hard to follow. Glatthaar The March to the Sea and Beyond , credits black soldiers, in great numbers with helping to achieve victory, something which is often overlooked or unknown.
Regardless, a good read. Lee's appointment with Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox. The authors emphasize military operations as opposed to industrial, demographic, psychological, or other factors—almost counterrevisionism, given recent trends in Civil War scholarship. McPherson provides a roundup of some of these chic theories e. The other essays aim to counteract what they see as faulty logic that makes Union battlefield success the result rather than the cause of Confederate failure.
Taking a more or less traditional view of the key generals, Gary W. Gallagher sees Grant and Sherman as the indispensable architects of Union victory, while defending Lee's much-criticized concentration on the eastern theater as the best strategic course for the rebels. Reid Mitchell contrasts the increasing cohesion of the Union rank-and-file with Johnny Reb's fears for the welfare of his family.
Without exaggerating their importance, Joseph Glatthaar gives one of the most succinct yet magisterial explanations to date of how blacks tipped the balance to the Union as the two armies teetered on the brink of exhaustion. As a global organization, we, like many others, recognize the significant threat posed by the coronavirus. During this time, we have made some of our learning resources freely accessible.
Our distribution centers are open and orders can be placed online. Do be advised that shipments may be delayed due to extra safety precautions implemented at our centers and delays with local shipping carriers. Request Examination Copy. After the Civil War, someone asked General Pickett why the Battle of Gettysburg had been lost: Was it Lee's error in taking the offensive, the tardiness of Ewell and Early, or Longstreet's hesitation in attacking?
Pickett scratched his head and replied, "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it. These were all factors, he writes, but the Civil War was still a war--won by the Union army through key victories at key moments. With this brilliant review of how historians have explained the Southern defeat, McPherson opens a fascinating account by several leading historians of how the Union broke the Confederate rebellion.
In every chapter, the military struggle takes center stage, as the authors reveal how battlefield decisions shaped the very forces that many scholars putting the cart before the horse claim determined the outcome of the war. Archer Jones examines the strategy of the two sides, showing how each had to match its military planning to political necessity.
Lee raided north of the Potomac with one eye on European recognition and the other on Northern public opinion--but his inevitable retreats looked like failure to the Southern public. The North, however, developed a strategy of deep raids that was extremely effective because it served a valuable political as well as military purpose, shattering Southern morale by tearing up the interior. James M. McPherson skillfully argues the old idea that the Confederates were very close to gaining independence in the summer of Without the Yankee victories that came that fall, Abraham Lincoln would not have been reelected and a peace party in the North might have abandoned the effort to hold the Union together.
At several "points of contingency" in , , and , "superior northern [military] leadership" produced victory. This interpretation of Federal success "seems more convincing than [do] other explanations for Union victory" 38, Archer Jones explores wartime strategy. The superior strength of the defense led Federal generals to reject a combat strategy in favor of a logistic strategy eventually modified into a raiding strategy of separating Rebel armies from the infrastructure that sustained them. The secessionists sought to protect their territory to provide support for their armies and to bolster public morale.
Both sides adapted military strategy to political reality. Gary W. Gallagher argues that the war's three most important commanders —Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Robert E.
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